Let us take for instance the qubits | 0 〉 and | 1 〉 , which are orthogonal. So, Bob can make a measurement that distinguishes whether Alice sends | 0 〉 or | 1 〉 . But what happens if she sends | + 〉 or | - 〉 ? Actually, Bob will obtain a result at random! More generally, if Bob receives | φ 〉 = α | 0 〉 + β | 1 〉 he will measure | 0 〉 with probability | α | 2 and | 1 〉 with probability | β | 2 – remember that | α | 2 + | β | 2 = 1 . In the particular case of | + 〉 and | - 〉 , Bob will get either | 0 〉 or | 1 〉 , each with probability 1 / 2 . Consequently, Bob is not able to distinguish between | + 〉 and | - 〉 in this case and gets a bit value uncorrelated from what Alice sent.
A range of research and commercial presentations will focus on state-of-the-art quantum key distribution, and the selection criteria for the new encryption algorithms that will protect the world's communications. Some of the next-generation standards development work currently in progress at ETSI and other international standards organizations will be reviewed.
Our goal is to identify and give focus to further research and development on quantum-safe cryptography and its application.
The workshop will showcase both the most recent requirements from industry and government, and cutting-edge potential solutions coming out of the most recent research.
To avoid quantum computing concerns, an elliptic curve-based alternative to Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman which is not susceptible to Shor's attack is the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange of De Feo, Jao and Plut. It uses elliptic curve isogenies to create a drop-in replacement for the quantum attackable Diffie–Hellman and Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman key exchanges. This key exchange uses the same elliptic curve computational primitives of existing elliptic curve cryptography and requires computational and transmission overhead similar to many currently used public key systems.